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Abstract:
In Spain’s last colony, Western Sahara, both efforts by the colonial power to stimulate development and
the negative impacts of colonisation intensified between the end of the Ifni-Sahara War (1957–58) and the
Spanish  withdrawal  in  1975.  Spanish  economical  and  geopolitical  interests  triggered  an  important
industrial and urban development of the territory. Cities such as Laayoune, Villa Cisneros, Smara, and the
Bou Craa phosphate deposits were to showcase Spanish modernising colonial policies.
However,  the effects  of  war,  the control  of  colonial  frontiers,  and severe droughts during the 1960s
strongly affected Sahrawi society. In this context,  the Spanish colonial state developed new forms of
control over the Sahrawi population, which included the progressive (forced) settling of nomadic people
around military posts and Spanish cities, bringing about the adoption of new economic paradigms. Not
only  did  the  Francoist  government  distribute  subsidies,  both  money  and  goods;  it  furthermore
implemented policies aimed at controlling the Sahrawi way of life, particularly in the areas of hygiene,
education, and gender relations. The essay analyses these “carrot-and-stick” strategies at the intersection
of colonial control and forced sedentarisation with regard to the implementation of a market-oriented
economy in Western Sahara.
Keywords: Western Sahara, Spanish colonialism in Africa, Ifni-Sahara War, Sección Femenina, social
and economic changes, Sahrawi nationalism
2Introduction
An oft-repeated  saying  used  throughout  the  dictatorship  of  Francisco  Franco in  Spain  described  the
Sahara as a province so Spanish that it rivalled the likes of Cuenca, Cádiz, or Santander. 1 The expression
has been attributed to both colonists and key figures in Franco’s dictatorship, such as General José Díaz
de Villegas y Bustamante or Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco, both of whom had strong ties to colonialism in
Africa.2 A statement on the imperial project of Spanish late colonialism, it suggested that the ability to
incorporate colonial  subjects into the national  project  was enough to justify the metropole’s ongoing
presence in these territories. To be “a province as Spanish as Cuenca” was an implicit expression of the
power of Franco’s regime to modernise and bestow a Hispanic identity upon these ostensibly primitive
societies.
While the intellectual roots of this justification date back to the Africanism of the nineteenth
century, this particular project did not take shape until the second half of the 1950s.3 In 1958, Spanish
colonies  in  Africa  were  granted  a  provincial  status,  paving  the  way  for  a  number  of  institutional
investments and renovations aimed at giving them a more metropolitan appearance. In the case of the
Sahara colony, this process came on the heels of the Ifni-Sahara War (1957–58), which highlighted the
lack of authority the Spanish had over the territory.4 In Western Sahara, France and Spain had fought for
control over the territory and its inhabitants, combining strategies of both attraction and dominance. As a
result, not only was the area divided into a series of fragmented borders, agreed upon through a number of
diplomatic agreements between France and Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century, but it also
saw the rise of new key figures established as intermediaries between the administration and the Sahrawi
population. 
After becoming a member of the United Nations in 1955, the Franco regime refused to provide a
list  of  non-self-governing  territories  under  Spanish  control.  In  fact,  these  strategies  were  initially
implemented with the intention of disguising the imperial, exploitative nature of the Spanish project. The
majority of international actors perceived provincialisation as a crude, sensationalist strategy aimed at
3prolonging colonial power for an indefinite period of time. However, it comes as no surprise that over the
years the Spanish administration gradually lost the support of its most important allies, such as the French
government. Meanwhile, the internal workings of the dictatorship saw various sectors becoming more
open to processes of decolonisation, in exchange for greater integration into the international community.
In  addition,  beginning  in  1955–56,  the  Kingdom of  Morocco,  which  had  gradually  begun repairing
strained relationships with its neighbours, included the Sahara as one of the territorial claims detailed on
the map of “Greater Morocco” distributed by leaders of the Istiqlāl political party.5
The Spanish strategy was to mimic the decisions made under the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal,
which had reformed its constitution in 1951 amid mounting pressures to decolonise, amending the status
of  its  colonies  to  “overseas  provinces.”  These  were  related  projects,  in  which  the  economic
transformation  of  the  provinces  was  accompanied  by  a  cultural  framework  typical  of  Iberian
dictatorships.6 Beyond appearances,  both  projects  responded to what  has  come to be  known as  “the
second occupation,” in line with the parallel processes geared towards intensifying public investment in
development programmes that took place during the late colonial period. Just as the French and British
empires had been doing since 1945, imperial rule was rekindled through increased political control under
the guise of modernisation, as well as by co-opting traditional male elites through financial support and
donations.7
This was a process similar to previous models of colonial domination, but with redoubled efforts
to build infrastructures and identify supposedly suitable social models, such as paid work or the relegation
of women to the domestic sphere.  In this sense, the influence these policies had on gender relations
became an interesting indicator. Both the Iberian empires and their British or French counterparts sought
to transform the role of women in society with institutions meant specifically for them. At the same time,
colonial  contact  brought  with  it  the  increased  importance  of  male  roles  in  colonised  societies:  men
mediated between colonial institutions, thereby assuming greater power and responsibility that they had
not had access to previously.8
These transformative processes were not without violence. The participation of the local Saharawi
4population became possible only after extensive social fragmentation, at least to a certain degree. The
indiscriminate bombing during the Ifni-Sahara War had disastrous consequences for the livelihoods of
pastoral nomads. These consequences (destruction of pastures and wells, obstacles to trans-Saharan trade)
opened the door to Spanish authoritarian social engineering, including policies of sedentarisation. The
introduction of wage labour, limiting women’s roles to those within the home, and the establishment of
physical borders would not have been possible without the arbitrary use of power and repressive police
control. 
Nevertheless,  co-optation  strategies  also  played  an  important  role  in  this  process.  Sheikhs 9
steadily lost power as the colonial administration continued to alter the context within which their role
had  developed.  However,  the  colonial  administration  gave  these  individuals  an  important  role  as
intermediaries, thus creating a new class of notables who depended on the government to maintain their
economic and social status. Sheikhs participated in the provincial government, both in local and regional
institutions, as well as in the distribution of social benefits amongst the Saharan population. Of course,
this was all under the watchful eye of the metropolitan government, which always had the final say in any
decisions.10
This  article  seeks  to  analyse  these  processes  of  repressive  development,  linking  the  social
transformations that took place in the Sahara from 1957 to 1975 with the uses and abuses of state power,
which often blurred the boarders between cultural repression and open violence. 11 We shall  begin by
examining the Ifni-Sahara War and its consequences: this was a crucially important event in the region’s
social and cultural history, although scholarship has focused so far only on the military aspects. 12 Further
on, we provide an analysis of the “provincialisation” of the colony, examining both the physical and
institutional transformations of the territory. Finally, we will consider a number of social groups that did
not form part of the regime’s co-optation, exploring the interplay between modernisation, social changes,
and exclusion, all of which have been influenced by the “colonial situation” and its inherent violence.13 
We contend that violence—whether in open warfare or in its shadow—constitutes the primary
condition and consequence of any colony. It seems paradoxical to talk about military “pacification” or
5“peaceful  penetration”  when  colonialism  has  always  entailed  the  control  of  a  few  over  many,  the
exploitation of a population’s resources, the disintegration of its social balance and political traditions—in
short: the indiscriminate use of direct or indirect violence to impose a political or social order alien to
those societies. By relating the 1957 war to subsequent processes of “modernisation” and social changes
until 1975, we seek to highlight the violence of a period that has largely been ignored by academia.14 
Ifni-Sahara War
During  the  1950s,  the  Spanish-ruled Saharan territory formed the epicentre  of  a  number  of  military
operations carried out by Spanish and French soldiers in an effort to expel what was known as the Army
of Liberation. Formed in 1953–54 by irregular troops from the rural and mountainous zones of Morocco,
it had become the main actor in the fight against the French Protectorate. 15 While part of the Army of
Liberation joined the Royal Armed Forces after Morocco had won its independence, several contingents
avoided incorporation into the new Moroccan army and established their command headquarters in the
south, in the city of Guelmim. Later, in 1955, during a time of complete political uncertainty, the Army of
Liberation launched a series of strategic incursions into the territories still under Spanish rule. 
Beginning  in  October  of  1956,  contingents  of  the  Army  of  Liberation  moved  into  Spanish
colonial territory. They had managed to obtain consent from Franco’s government after expressing their
willingness to only attack the Mauritanian and Algerian territories, both of which were under French rule
at the time. In fact, in June and July 1956, the Army of Liberation carried out two attacks against French
positions in Algeria, and in January and February 1957, two more took place against positions of the same
army in Mauritania.16 Although these incursions ultimately failed, the army also made a concerted effort
to proselytise, which proved to be quite successful in the region of Ifni, where they received massive
support from the Ait Baamrane tribe, and in the Sahara, where recruitment took place from family to
family in the name of jihad against the colonial occupation. Despite ample signs of these groups’ eventual
intentions of recovering these territories, Spanish authorities ultimately chose to ignore them. 
6That  said,  in  the  summer  of  1957,  relations  between  the  Army  of  Liberation  and  Spanish
authorities  rapidly  deteriorated.  The  latter  decided  to  withdraw  all  European  soldiers  from  inland
positions, including the Ifni and Saharan regions. The Army of Liberation swiftly took advantage of the
movement, occupying the deserted positions one by one. On 23 November, colonial troops were surprised
in a coordinated attack on the city of Sidi Ifni, capital of the Ifni region. On that day, as several battalions
of the Army of Liberation besieged the city, people throughout the whole territory rose up against the
colonial power. As a result of their ill-fated movements, by the time the 1957–58 winter approached, the
Spanish army controlled only the urban centres on the coast. Meanwhile, the Army of Liberation, which
had between seven and eight thousand soldiers by the summer of 1957, had secured the inland positions.17
After lengthy negotiations between the Spanish and French governments, a series of large-scale
military operations were launched in January 1958, in an effort to expel the Army of Liberation from the
Saharan and Ifni territories. These operations, referred to as Écouvillon by the French and Teide/Huracán
by  the  Spanish  army,  involved  bombing  both  Army  of  Liberation  contingents  and  nomadic  camps
suspected of supporting the “rebels” in the Sahara, including settlements’ livestock and wells.18
After  the  formal  end  of  military  operations,  the  government  in  Madrid  ceded  Tarfaya,  the
southern area of the Spanish protectorate, to Rabat on 2 April 1958. The city of Ifni itself became a
Spanish enclave, until it was retroceded to the Alaouite kingdom a decade later on 30 June 1969. Both the
Sahara and the Ifni settlement were rebranded as new “metropolitan provinces” on 10 January 1958,
thereby avoiding labelling the territories as colonies, a status that was confirmed three years later with Act
8/61 of 19 April 1961. This measure enabled Franco’s government to promote the colonisation process
despite the growing global trend towards decolonisation.
Although  the  way  in  which  the  Ifni-Sahara  War  was  managed  implies  a  certain  level  of
complicity between the Moroccan and Spanish governments, given the government of Rabat sustained
silence throughout the Franco-Spanish military operations, the end of the war did not see the territories
successfully reclaimed as per the proposed map of Greater Morocco made official by the nationalist party
Istiqlāl in 1956.19 Throughout the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, these claims to
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sables o Jarb ar-rimal) against Algeria in 1963.20 Mauritania’s independence was recognised by the Rabat
government in 1969, creating great political friction between the monarchy and the Istiqlāl party. These
Moroccan territorial demands formed part of the broader political conflict that had ravaged the Kingdom
of Morocco since its independence; they had also been used to help ease the strong social uproar that had
characterised the country since the mid-1960s.21 
While territorial disputes had a larger impact on the Spanish government’s Saharan policies, they
were not the only issue of concern for the colonial administration. The most important internal concern
came from attitudes on the part of the territory’s population, who, having already had a taste of the power
that jihad had lent them from 1956 to 1958, once again found themselves subjugated to colonial rule.
With the return of colonial rule came its inherently violent power structures. 
First,  there  was  the  propaganda  that  Istiqlāl  distributed  through  its  offices  in  Villa  Bens,
Laayoune, Smara, and Villa Cisneros, as well as Ifni; these offices had been open since the Kingdom of
Morocco  gained  its  independence,  but  they  were  all  closed  once  the  Army  of  Liberation’s  actions
intensified. Second, many men took active part in the armed struggle against the army from within the
territory,  rendering  more  than  necessary  the  development  of  a  policy  that  could  offset  any  possible
nationalist sentiments among those who no longer accepted a colonial administration in the Sahara. Thus,
the Spanish colonial administration was forced to take action, not only to allow it to remain in the region,
but also to legitimise the Spanish presence there in the eyes of the people and, by extension, justify that
presence with respect  to  overarching Moroccan ambitions and the prevailing wave of decolonisation
sweeping  the  Maghreb.  In  this  postwar  setting  an  often  contradictory  colonial  policy  combining
incentives and coercion evolved, which coined Spain’s repressive developmentalism in Western Sahara
until 1975.
8The Spanish Response and Postwar Policies to Attract Notables 
Following Spain’s entry into the United Nations in 1955, it was bound by Chapter XI of the UN Charter
to disclose any non-self-governing territories under its rule. By deeming them provinces, the Spanish
government sought to get its African colonies off the list of non-self-governing territories. This tactic did
not prove to be successful. The UN continued to insist that Spain decolonise its “African provinces,” with
the  Moroccan government  staunchly  backing  this  initiative  from its  inception.  Faced with  mounting
pressure, the Franco regime responded in an ambiguous manner, attempting to prolong its presence in the
territory  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time.  Although  the  Spanish  government  eventually  supported
resolutions calling for decolonisation of the Sahara, the territory saw a number of new policies that served
to  intensify  colonisation,  showcasing  the imperial  repertoire  of  different  but  concurrent  strategies  of
domination.22
These policies had major repercussions for the people of the Sahara when the colonial power
attempted  to  win  some  of  them as  supporters  of  the  Spanish  presence  in  the  territory.  One  of  the
administration’s first actions was to create harkas (militia contingents) on the northern border, made up of
irregular Sahrawis who, while not officially part of the Spanish army, fell under its command. The aim
was to intensify rivalries between the different tribes in the south of Morocco and create a climate of
insecurity. These harkas, organised on a tribal basis, were different from the battalions of the Army of
Liberation  in  that  they  were  entrusted  with  carrying  out  incursions,  especially  within  the  region  of
Tarfaya and its  surroundings.  The Spanish forces  were  assisted  at  the  time by  the  French forces  of
Mauritania, who created “partisan” militias in the region of Adrar at the border with the Spanish-ruled
Sahara, to support French opposition to Morocco’s territorial claims to Mauritania.23
Additionally,  in  an  effort  to  assuage  the  frustrations  and discontent  of  people  who  had just
undergone the most turbulent months in the territory’s contemporary history, the Spanish government
decided  to  reimburse  the  damages  caused  in  the  conflicts  of  1957–58.  Remunerations  covered  the
9destruction  caused  by  military  actions  of  both  the  Army of  Liberation  and the  French and Spanish
militaries; casualty lists were drafted, including hundreds of names, and were constantly updated at the
request of notables who demanded money from the government. Victims were directly compensated not
only for the death of family members but also for the destruction or loss of livestock, provisions, or
personal possessions.24 These sums were granted over a period of time dating back from spring of 1958 to
the mid-1960s.25
Most revealingly, the greatest consensus mechanisms put into place to entice the local population
were  known  as  “social  assistance.”  These  benefits  involved  material  aid  that  was  provided  by  the
Francoist  government,  beginning  at  the  end  of  1959,  in  response  to  requests  from  the  population
prompted  by  the  intense  droughts  affecting  the  territory  and the  subsequent  loss  of  pastureland.  By
gaining the loyalty of the inhabitants of the “new province,” the Spanish government managed to shield
the population of the territory from possible Mauritanian or Moroccan influences that may have otherwise
bolstered a rise in anti-colonial sentiments amongst Saharawi, as had already occurred during the Ifni-
Sahara War. In 1959, the governor of Spanish Sahara anticipated a total amount of about 1.3 million
pesetas  in  food aid,  in  addition  to  over  six  hundred  thousand  pesetas  for  distribution  in  cash,  as  a
“reimbursable” advance. This money came from the Spanish state, as the province did not have sufficient
funds; it had to be increased, with an extraordinary credit  of some 6.4 million pesetas designated for
“social action expenses.” This amount made up 12 percent of the total budget of 53.5 million pesetas
allocated  to  the  province  in  1960.  This  extensive  assistance  programme  was  continually  renewed
throughout Spain’s presence in the region until 1975.26
Nevertheless, these social benefits were not handed out equally: their distribution fell largely into
the hands of the sheikhs, who often favoured their own families and clientelistic networks. In other cases,
the  colonial  administrators  themselves  organised the distribution of  benefits  via  patrol  groups whose
routes  reached  the  most  isolated  corners  of  the  “Saharan  provinces.”  This  enabled  the  surreptitious
creation of a mechanism for surveillance,  control  and reconnaissance of local  populations,  especially
those that had not yet been settled in urban centres on the Atlantic coast, such as Laayoune or Villa
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Cisneros.  Furthermore,  the  notables  who  managed  the  distribution  of  benefits  occasionally  illegally
appropriated funds, channelling them into the informal trade routes that wound their way from the Sahara
to Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. In this sense, Spanish colonialism created members of a new upper
class, thereby guaranteeing their cooperation as intermediaries between the provincial government and
those without direct access to the administration. Spain’s paternalistic welfare colonialism with its new
cooperation networks contributed to further political and tighter social control throughout the territory.
Territorial  Exploitation  and  Institutionalisation  of  the  Colony  during  the  Period  of
Provincialisation 
Parallel  to  the  enticement  strategies  implemented  through  remunerations  and  social  benefits,  and  in
accordance with the establishment of the territory as a province, the colonial government implemented an
intense modernisation policy. This consisted of establishing industries for the economic exploitation of
natural resources; developing an entire institutional apparatus to legitimise and justify Spain’s presence;
and expanding urban centres  to  accommodate  the  population  which  Spanish  colonial  rule  sought  to
sedentarise. The Spanish official “colonial mind” considered the nomadic way of life as something from
another time, as an obstacle with regard to the territory’s “modernization” and “development.”27
The colony’s  main  economic  interests  lay  in  taking  advantage  of  its  mining  resources.  This
exploitation moved slowly, due to the lack of infrastructure. In 1947, important phosphate deposits were
discovered in Bou Craa, near Laayoune. However, it was not until the 1959 hydrocarbons law that the
area was fully investigated. In 1964, the government-funded company ENMINSA constructed permanent
facilities  in  the  mines  and  moved  a  large  number  of  workers  to  the  site. 28 Eventually,  a  hundred-
kilometre-long conveyor belt was installed, connecting the mine site to the sea via a dock that allowed
freighters to offload raw materials. The  Spanish company Fos Bucraa was formed in order to further
exploit  the  local  resources,  showcasing  Spanish  stimulation  of  the  Saharan  economy  at  home  and
abroad.29
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Another resource that caught the colonial power’s attention were the fishing grounds shared with
the Canary Island coasts.  Fishing was an important source of capital attraction, and it was of special
interest to islanders concerned about securing the African coasts for their own factories. The economic
interests shared with the Canary Islands did not end with fishing; by the second half of the 1960s, a
growing number of tourists staying in Gran Canaria or Tenerife began to show an interest in visiting
Laayoune  and  Villa  Cisneros.  The  National  Parador  of  Laayoune,30 opened  in  1969,  was  the  most
characteristic example of the Spanish government’s attempt to incorporate its African colony into the
rising surge of tourism, which played an increasingly important role in the country’s economy. 
Economic investments, alongside the institutional developments that came with this new era of
colonisation,  brought  a  relatively  important  contingent  of  Spaniards  to  Western  Sahara.  To  the
traditionally military population were added civilians, such as military family members who arrived along
with the increased development of education and health services, especially in bigger urban centres such
as Laayoune and Villa Cisneros. The civil servants in charge of these services contributed to the growing
European population in the Sahara.31 Finally,  mining companies attracted a certain number of skilled
labourers, in addition to the fishing industry and the possibility of providing services, all of which served
as incentives for joining the expanding colony from the Canary Islands. 
In  the  new urban  centres,  the  recently  arrived  metropolitan  population  encountered  pastoral
nomads. The latter were forced to turn to the former for assistance, due to the economic destruction (of
livestock and pasture) suffered as a result of the Ifni-Sahara War, and attracted by the resulting ease of
access  to  benefits  provided  by  the  colonial  government.  Laayoune,  Villa  Cisneros,  and  Smara  were
surrounded by neighbourhoods made up of a combination of  jaimas, the nomads’ traditional tents, and
self-built huts, inhabited mainly by Sahrawis. The sudden growth of these cities posed a genuine housing
crisis that the Spanish administration first attempted to solve in 1963. It was in this year that the National
Institute  of  Housing  (Instituto  Nacional  de  Vivienda)32 began  intervening  by  implementing  a  major
construction plan. Construction continued throughout the 1960s and continued to expand into the 1970s
with the creation of neighbourhoods such as Colominas around Laayoune. These new buildings were
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planned according to the inhabitants that  they were to receive, depending on whether the latter were
soldiers, civilians, or Sahrawis.33
Additionally,  the  province  was  organised  around  an  institutional  duality.  The  Decree  of  14
December 1961 established a legal  regime for  the province that,  while  drawing inspiration from the
state’s fundamental laws, had to take into account the characteristics and peculiarities of the territory. A
number of traditional, Sahrawi-led institutions were proposed, including the Yemáa, the Saharan general
assembly, and sharia law, a legal system inspired by the common law of the nomad society. A wide range
of services were organised by the Presidency of the Government in Madrid, which had authority over the
“new provinces” and its dependants, and ultimately by the General Government of the Sahara, controlled
by high-ranking military officers; it was these bodies that would make any de facto decisions. Alongside
these institutions at the local level was a series of bodies inspired by the Francoist “organic democracy”
that combined representation of the Sahrawi and metropolitan populations within the limited dictatorial
political framework. 
Amongst the services controlled by the General Government were the treasury, justice, education,
health,  public  works,  architecture,  mines,  telecommunications,  work,  information,  and  security.  In
addition, hospitals, primary and secondary schools, and other public buildings were created over time and
incorporated  into  the  urban  centres,  mainly  serving  the  interests  of  the  newly  settled  metropolitan
population. Regarding health services, for example, there were four centres in 1953, which had grown to
twenty-five by 1972, thus adequately covering the needs of the urban centres (but not of rural areas, that
is, the desert).34 The majority of educational services were primary schools, but there were also secondary
schools in Laayoune and Villa Cisneros, as well as the boarding school (escuela-hogar) for children in
Laayoune and the Sección Femenina centres for women in Laayoune, Villa Cisneros, and Smara.35
The  Sección  Femenina  and  its  schools  and  centres  revealed  the  gendered  aspects  of  new
institutions in the Sahara.36 The Francoist-inspired Falangist organisation was in charge of helping women
find their niche within the dictatorship, as well as providing education, health, and political services.37 Its
main area  of  influence was in  Laayoune,  which hosted a  girls’  boarding school,  textile  cooperative,
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women’s  centre,  and  a  recreational  activity  group for  girls  (which  also  organised  activities  in  Villa
Cisneros and Smara). These services were primarily aimed at Sahrawi women who had settled in the
urban centres, teaching them what were considered essential tasks for women, such as cooking, cleaning,
and  childcare.  The  colonial  administration  used  these  activities  to  firmly  link  Saharawi  women’s
education to the concept of how to run a household in the newly built settlements in the suburbs. 
Although the majority of these efforts were aimed at equipping women with the skills needed to
properly manage their  new homes,  housework was far  from the Falangist  regime’s  main concern.  It
wanted  to  prepare  women  for  those  jobs  considered  well  suited  to  them,  with  the  ultimate  goal  of
incorporating them into the cycle of production and consumption.38 It also sought to include women in the
national  project,  thereby showcasing the ostensible inclusivity of Spanish imperialism.39 Finally,  over
time, the Women’s Section sought to enlist the help of some of these women in maintaining its power
throughout the Sahara, an effort that was met with great resistance.40
As regards the governmental institutions in which Sahrawis participated, the local level was of
primary importance.  Four urban centres were established:  two as municipalities (Laayoune and Villa
Cisneros) and two as smaller local entities (Smara and La Güera), whose representatives were chosen
following the principles of the so-called organic democracy. In this way, voting rights were granted to
male heads of household residing in any of the aforementioned urban centres. However, only half of these
advisers were directly elected; the other half was selected from amongst representatives of commerce,
industry, the cultural sector, and professions, most of whom were Spanish. The same was true of the
provincial council, which was established by the provincial government and composed of a president, a
vice-president, and fourteen councillors. Two of these councillors represented town halls and small local
entities, six represented the nomadic divisions, and the remaining six represented different sectors.41
The province of the Sahara also had three representatives in the Francoist courts, chosen by the
government  from amongst  its  most  influential  members.  In  1963,  the  three representatives  were  the
mayors of Laayoune and Villa Cisneros and the president of the provincial council. By 1967, the number
of  representatives  in  the  courts  had  increased  to  six,  two  of  whom  were  chosen  among  heads  of
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household,  with  the  remaining  four  appointed  by  the  government.  The  participation  of  Sahrawi
representatives  in  the  court  system  served  the  colonial  administration  by  legitimising  Sahrawi
participation in the other, wholly undemocratic institutions of the dictatorship. 
Finally, we should also mention the Yemáa, or general assembly, a “traditional” institution that
served as a provincial representative body. Its members were elected for the first time in 1967 and again
in 1971 according to the regime’s organic principles.42 
The introduction of all of these instruments of governance and domination demonstrates how the
Francoist dictatorship exploited the disruptive consequences of the war to completely transform both the
territory  and the people’s  social  ways of  life.  The institutional  framework was meant  to  justify  and
complement a modernisation project that ultimately aimed to incorporate the colonial territory into the
dictatorship’s  extractive  logics.  This,  in  turn,  was  based  on a  series  of  standards  imported  from the
metropole, which sought to transpose peninsular social, gender, and political models that clashed with the
previous forms of life in the colony. Imposition of Spanish culture, including a sedentary way of life, was
meant to ensure social stability. 
Social Changes during the Late Colonialism of the Sahara
Within the territory, colonisation brought with it increasing social and economic authority of notables
who found themselves  newly empowered through their  dealings  with the  colonial  metropole. 43 Once
traditional  tribal  warfare  paradigms  had  shifted,  sheikhs  quickly  adapted  their  roles  to  become
intermediaries between the pastoral society and the colonial administration.44 This historical process, in
which the system of social benefits played a highly relevant role, led to a sharp increase in the number of
dignitaries.45 The development of an administrative structure in the Sahara province saw their political
and economic power institutionalised; mayors, legal representatives, and members of the Yemáa were all
chosen from amongst this new social elite. 
It is easy to see why anthropologist Rita Laura Segato has labelled this a “hyperinflation of male
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status,” a process by which the role of men in colonial societies as liaisons with the colonial power led to
the inevitable creation of a male-dominated, privileged public sphere.46 The process influenced gender
relations in these societies, enabling the formation of an alliance between colonised male elites and the
colonial power, to the detriment of women. Once power structures such as sharia law, sheikhdom, or the
Yemáa had been institutionalised,  any influence women had held in precolonial  society was steadily
eroded.  Moreover,  the  few  societal  opportunities  the  colonial  administration  did  offer  women,  for
example through the Sección Femenina, forced them to accept certain aspects of urban life that ensured
continued  female  subalternity  within  the  public  sphere  and  stressed  the  importance  of  women’s
attachment to the home.
In this manner, the Yemáa launched an attempt to control the price of dowries in 1971. Amongst
the military documents found in the general military archives of Ávila are complaints from several youths
describing themselves as “successful young elites” (a post office civil servant, Saharan radio announcer,
and merchant), who noted with dismay the high dowries fathers demanded for their daughters, especially
for those who formed part of the Sección Femenina. In addition, it was also reported that “at the General
Assembly, the sheikhs have drafted a document aimed at limiting dowries, but it is not respected, as in
Morocco dowries are even cheaper and women are better equipped to run a household.”47
A number of dynamics can be observed in this complaint: first, the effects of differing dowry
prices in Tarfaya and the territory controlled by Spain; second, recognition of the value of women who
had acquired certain skills, such as the ability to run a household; and, finally, the willingness of the
sheikhs  represented  in  the  Yemáa  to  interfere  in  marriage  negotiations.48 This  particular  dynamic
traditionally involved the entire family group, leading to the creation of sororities that united women from
different families.49 The legislation bypassed the tools women had previously used to contend with their
inferior status in the colonial context.
This was not  an isolated attempt to control  the marriage market.  Notables represented in the
Yemáa also sought to control  divorces,  through which women could request  a separation from their
husbands, who were subject to certain social pressure to accept.50 The following is a complaint filed with
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the inspector of the Sección Femenina in autumn of 1974: 
A former student told us she had secured a divorce from her husband at her own request, via
payment  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  pesetas.  This  unprecedented  case  (which  was
immediately followed by another) is in accordance with a decision taken at the Yemáa on 4-5-74,
which reads as follows:
Any married woman who rejects her husband is bound to either choose to carry on living with her
husband  at  their  home  of  residence,  or  give  him  FIFTY THOUSAND (50,000)  DUROS  in
Spanish currency. Should this amount be paid, the husband is then obliged to divorce his wife. 
Women insist  that  the  Yemáa’s  decision should be reconsidered,  as  this  situation  negatively
affects them. The Koran establishes that dowries should be returned.51
Once again, the privilege granted to men by the colonial administration allowed them to circumvent the
traditional means by which Sahrawi women could negotiate their position within the family. These cases
demonstrate how a certain class of women formed yet another social group marginalised by colonisation.
The male empowerment brought about through the institutionalisation of certain decision-making forums
destroyed some of the tools women had previously used to engage on key issues such as marriage.52
The structures proposed by the Spanish administration as new channels of female representation
proved ineffective. It is worth noting here the inability of the sole Francoist women’s organisation, the
Sección Femenina, to organise itself in the face of demands made by Sahrawi women, such as calling for
their  assistance  in  battling  attempts  to  control  marriage  on  the  part  of  the  Yemáa.  For  the  colonial
administration, the role of the state was to guarantee women’s access only to very specific training and
education, equipping them to bear children and limiting them to very specific niches within the labour
market,  thereby imposing  colonial  gender  roles.53 Moreover,  issues  related  to  family  rights,  such  as
dowries or age of marriage,  were considered private matters in which the institution had no right  to
interfere.54
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On another note, the process of monetisation seen in this phase of colonisation should also be
highlighted.  This  phenomenon was  linked to  an  increase  in  the  importance  of  wage  labour  and the
creation of a labour market. Investments originating in the metropole increased starting from the mid-
twentieth century, leading to inflation and providing some limited opportunities for Sahrawi entry into the
market economy. In this respect, the role of the Spanish state as an investor was essential, promoting
large mineral extraction companies such as Fos Bucraa, as well as constructing infrastructure including
roads and homes and promoting industrial activities such as fishing and tourism. 
In  contrast  to  these  economic  phenomena,  which  were  more  significant  within  urban  areas,
traditional  nomadic  practices  were  under  threat.55 The  result  was  a  dual  economy  that  nonetheless
maintained a certain continuity. This was reflected in the distribution of occupations amongst the different
areas of the province found in the 1974 census.56 Although the majority of those surveyed appeared to not
have  an  occupation,  those  who did  worked primarily  as  farmers  or  labourers,  followed  by  soldiers,
merchants, and drivers.57
Both farming and labouring work involved a kind of  nomadism,  as  pointed out  in  the  1974
census: “The creation of jobs on tracts of land that are currently being built or repaired also gives rise to
the slow displacement of many families from one area to another.”58 Similar patterns can be observed in
the case of drivers. In contrast, people who traditionally served in the military could often be traced back
to prestigious families.59 
The colonial regime’s emphasis on wage labour and generating jobs strengthened the position of
the  sheikhs,  who were able  to  insert  themselves  into  the  process  as  intermediaries.  Meanwhile,  this
growth also opened up new job vacancies for qualified young workers.  However, the skilled jobs and
positions of political responsibility that the dictatorship was able to generate were restricted by a need for
political control and economic profitability. Thus, sheikhs in privileged positions limited the prospects of
youths who had to face an increasingly full administration. It should be noted that in 1966, 51 percent of
the  province’s  population  were  under  twenty  years  of  age,  making  this  a  crucially  important
demographic.60
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When defining spaces of social transformation in the period of provincialisation, the increasingly
important urban phenomenon must be emphasised. Urban centres were appealing to those who had dealt
with the effects of the 1958 war61 and the long-term droughts of 1958–1969 and 1973–1975.62 If the
Spanish  anthropologist  Caro  Baroja  described  society  in  the  mid-1950s  as  preeminently  nomadic,63
observers  in  the  1970s  would  characterise  the  decade  by  its  seemingly  unstoppable  wave  of
sedentarisation.64 It is within this context that the relatively important urban centres of Laayoune or Villa
Cisneros  figured prominently.65 However,  there  were  also  a  number  of  areas  that,  although sparsely
populated from a quantitative standpoint, underwent a qualitative change in levels of nomadism, which
had prevailed in the area just a quarter of a century before; urbanisation within the territory grew to over
55 percent, with some sources even citing an urbanisation rate of 82 percent. 
The city became a space characterised by a certain possibility of accessing the market-based
economy,  as  expressed  in  many  poetical  controversies  of  the  time.66 These  poems  contrasted  the
prevalence of nomadic life in the desert with the opportunities provided by urban life,  as seen in the
poems  exchanged  between  Salama  Uld  Eydud  and  Yedehlu  Uld  Esid.67 The  latter  had  moved  to
Laayoune, where he worked as a roofer from 1958 to 1968 before returning to nomadic life.68 In 1972, as
a result of the second terrible drought that ravaged the territory, he lost almost all his livestock and was
forced to move back to the city. He wrote poems on urban life throughout this time, but they retained a
certain nostalgia for his life in the desert.
Besides being a place of relative refuge, the city became a defining place in the identity of certain
younger generations. Upon carrying out a study prior to the 1974 census, researcher Pablo San Martín69
noted  how,  when  asked  about  their  tribal  origins,  several  young  Sahrawis  residing  in  the  capital
responded “politely, but proudly, that they were residents of Laayoune, Street X, Number X.” 70 He argues
that young people sought to challenge the traditional colonial classification system, which was based on
tribe affiliation.  San Martín attributed these changing attitudes to two factors:  resentment against  the
sheikhs, whose power was now largely derived from their role as intermediaries in the service of the
colonial administration, and growing disillusionment with the social and economic changes taking place
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in Sahrawi society at the time.71
Further sociocultural disruptions were a consequence of the Operation Teide-Écouvillon, with the
subsequent retrocession of the region of Tarfaya to Morocco, which further fragmented the traditionally
nomadic  space  of  the  Sahrawis  that  had  once  reached  the  limits  of  Wādī  Dra‘a.  This  is  a  highly
interconnected area in which tightened borders led to a number of divergent economic processes, causing
major inequalities between adjacent territories; by 1975, the per capita GDP of the Sahara colony was
$2,550, much higher than the $180 in Mauritania, $270 in Morocco, or $430 in Algeria.72 Nonetheless,
relations were still maintained between the different populations in the region.
Among the populations most closely linked to colonisation were the exiles who had suffered as a
result  of the repression of various anti-colonial movements. Ex-combatants of the 1958 war migrated
from the Sahara towards the region of Tarfaya, crossing the frontier to escape Spanish oppression. The
same thing occurred just over a decade later in the wake of protests in Hatarrambla, in which the first
genuinely Sahrawi nationalist movement, the Harakat Tahrir (Liberation Front), was brutally repressed by
the Spanish Legion in June 1970.73 In this latter case, groups of people emigrated to settle in Zuérat
(Mauritania) or in Tindouf (Algeria), establishing an anti-colonial network beyond the territory’s borders. 
The emergence of the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and
Río  de  Oro)  in  May  1973  saw an  organised  anti-colonial  movement  demanding  the  creation  of  an
independent  state  on Spanish colonial  territory.  From this  moment  forward,  the  colonial  government
found itself  under the considerable pressure of anti-colonial  sentiments,  both in the form of guerrilla
activity at the territory’s borders and through the genuine political mobilisation taking place from within
urban centres. The growing global consensus on decolonisation presented a new opportunity for Morocco.
Madrid, however, continued to provide conflicting responses. In response to demands from the Yemáa, in
1973 the colonial government began to expand the limited representative powers of Saharan institutions.
A few months after this decision came the promise to make the territory autonomous, not unlike the path
Equatorial Guinea had taken before its independence. However, in December of that same year, the death
of Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco—a highly influential figure in the dictatorship and a staunch proponent
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of maintaining the colony at any cost—greatly weakened the proposal.74
From 1974 onwards, the Spanish government established a change of course in politics in the
Sahara.  With  supporters  of  a  permanent  colonial  presence  having  lost  their  leader,  a  policy  of
decolonisation was established for the short term, in flagrant disregard of the directives followed up until
that time in the more recalcitrant colonialist settlements in the Sahara. From that moment on, the future
independence of the colony was sought, favouring the emergence of a new political class capable of
overseeing the process. The Sahrawi National Union Party (PUNS) was a puppet party created for this
purpose in 1974. It was mainly composed of the notables who had remained loyal to Spain over the past
years and who opposed the Polisario Front, which represented the Sahrawi people.75 
Finally, having reached an agreement with Mauritania, in December 1974 Morocco urged the UN
General Assembly to request an inquiry on the territorial statutes from the Court of Justice at The Hague.
The Alaouite kingdom sought to justify the annexation of the Spanish colony in the Sahara before a self-
determination referendum was held. However, the advisory notice issued on 16 October 1975 established
that  the  territory  of  the  old  “Saharan  province  of  Spain”  was  not terra  nullius before  colonisation,
although it recognised that some populations had historically been linked to the Alaouite sultan, while
others maintained relationships with the “Mauritanian entity.” It  was in this context  that  the Spanish
government had begun to adopt certain measures, such as carrying out a census enabling the Saharan
population to express their thoughts on the self-determination referendum under the control of the UN. 
However, on 6 November 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco ordered an invasion of the Sahara,
known as the Green March, led by three hundred fifty thousand Moroccans. Battles quickly broke out
between the Moroccan army and the Polisario Front; meanwhile, the colonial power swiftly withdrew,
with agreements signed in Madrid on 14 November 1975, dividing the territory between Morocco and
Mauritania. The parties involved in the armed conflict against these movements were made up of the new
generation of Sahrawis born throughout the 1950s, whose lives had been tremendously affected by the
social and economic changes of the period of provincialisation. It was from within this same generation
that the new Sahrawi independence movement had originated, culminating in 1973 with the Popular Front
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for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro.76
Conclusions
On 12 October 1975, the higher ranks of Sahrawi society, represented by sheikhs—including a number of
representative notables from the Yemáa or the Francoist courts—surrendered their authority to the young
members of the Polisario Front in Ain Ben Tili, a small military settlement on the northern frontier of
Mauritania with Western Sahara.77 Beyond the fact that the Front could serve as a vehicle for the anti-
colonial struggle, this time against Morocco, this was a singularly revolutionary decision that disrupted
the social hierarchies that had previously dominated life in the province. The gesture was particularly
confusing since the sheikh authorities’ power was transformed by colonial dynamics, especially during
the final period from 1958 to 1975. 
In this  manner,  one might  question whether this revolutionary act  was aimed at  tackling the
colonial hierarchies or at subverting the traditional order.78 Throughout this text we have seen how the
colonial power propped up certain notables, fragmenting the traditional society and displacing a large
number of people.  However,  though this dynamic had intensified after  1958,  it  had marked Western
Saharan society since the nineteenth century. In this sense, it is not surprising that these events could be
interpreted as an attack on the colonial order.
Tackling the effects of colonisation that had harmed Sahrawi society meant the implementation of
policies that fully encapsulated the various threads of current discourse, both in precolonial practices and
the revolutionary traditions of the time.79 Thus, for example, women’s demands were emerging within the
refugee camps. Women were able to achieve political importance in the administration of the camps,
although they were not granted access to hierarchically higher positions.80 Dowries—and subsequently,
the cost of divorce—were abolished, and women were granted new educational options.81 
In fact, what is scarcely taken into account is that colonisation was marked by violence, not only
in the direct manner seen in the wars of 1957–58 or 1975, but also in a structural manner inherent to the
“colonial  situation,”  as  per  George  Balandier’s  definition.82 This  involved  the  exclusion  of  certain
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populations,  such as  women, from the redistributive and security mechanisms of  precolonial  society,
leaving them no choice but the options provided by the colonial administration. The final result was to
incorporate the territory and its inhabitants to the logics of capitalism expressed via (oftentimes) forced
control.83 In these transformations—as in all colonialism over the centuries—the co-optation of certain
elements of the colonised societies as “collaborators” proved necessary. However, even this intermediary
class saw the formation of some important niches of resistance.84
Beyond the debate over the precolonial or traditional nature of these demands, what this study
reveals is the fluidity and the dynamics of social practices, as well as the importance of the late colonial
period in defining these concepts. That said, the period has been largely ignored by historiographers. The
Ifni-Sahara War was covered up by the dictatorial press,85 and African provincial issues were monitored
throughout the whole process, with propaganda being the only information to reach the masses. Only now
has the academic community begun to show an interest in this volatile period of time. The previous lack
of interest has been exacerbated by the political conflict that has been ravaging in the Sahara for four
decades;86 academic  research  has  been  hampered,  due  to  the  instability  of  the  period  after  Spanish
colonisation.87 If  we  focus  on  the  period  between  1957  and  1975,  as  Spanish  colonisation  was
intensifying, we can better comprehend the social processes in the territory and relate them to the legacy
of European imperialism at large. 
Acknowledgements
We would like  to  acknowledge Andreas Stucki  for  inviting us to  the meeting “Violence,  Migration,
Cooperation, and Gender. Late Portuguese and Spanish Colonialism in Africa Reconsidered,” held in
Bern the 26th and 27th of November 2016, where the ideas of this article started to be worked on. 
Bibliography 
23
Unpublished Primary Sources
Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares, Spain (AGA):
- Sección 3 (Cultura), Fondo 51.19 (Sección Femenina de Sáhara, Ifni, Región Ecuatorial)
- Sección 15 (África), Fondo 24 (Gobierno General del Sahara)
Archivo General Militar de Ávila, Spain (AGMAV):
-  Sección  1.2  (Instituciones  de  la  Administración  Territorial),  Fondo  1.2.3  (Capitanías  y
Comandancias Generales)
Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Spain (RAH):
- Archivo Documental de “Nueva Andadura,” Tercera Etapa, Serie Azul (NA)
Published Primary Sources
Al Fāsi, Allāl. Livre rouge avec documentaires. Tanger: Peretti, 1961.
Alonso  del  Barrio,  Jose  Enrique.  Las  Tribus  del  Sahara.  Laayoune:   Servicio  de  publicaciones  del
Gobierno del Sahara, 1973.
Caro Baroja, Julio. Estudios Saharianos. Madrid: ONO, 1990 [1955].
Cruz Tizón, Tony. “Encuesta pública en torno a nuestro pabellón.” Sahara, 6 June 1965.
Gobierno General del Sahara. Censo 1974. Laayoune: Servicio de Registro de Población, 1975.
Sahara, Provincia española. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos (CSIC), 1966. 
24
United Nations. The Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. New York:
United Nations, 1977.
Secondary Sources
Allan, Joanna. “Imagining Saharawi Women: The Question of Gender in POLISARIO Discourse.”  The
Journal of North African Studies 15:2 (2010): 189–202.
Allan, Joanna.  Silenced Resistance: Women, Dictatorships, and Genderwashing in Western Sahara and
Equatorial Guinea. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019. 
Awad,  Bahía  Mahmud.  “Generaciones  Literarias:  Intelectualidad  y  Política  en  el  Sahara  Occidental,
1850–1975.” Les Cahiers d’EMAM 24–25 (2015): 29–54.
Balandier, Georges. “The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach.” In Social Change: The Colonial
Situation, ed. by Immanuel Wallerstein, 34–61. New York: Wiley, 1966 [1951].
Bárbulo, Tomás. Historia prohibida del Sahara Occidental. Las claves del conflicto que condiciona las
relaciones entre España y el Magreb. Madrid: Destino, 2002.
Barona, Claudia. Los hijos de la nube. Estructura y vicisitudes del Sahara Español desde 1958 hasta la
debacle. Madrid: Langre, 2009.
Bengochea Tirado, Enrique. Entrega, hogar e imperio: La Sección Femenina en la provincia de Sahara.
Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2019.
Bengochea  Tirado,  Enrique. “Las  mujeres  saharauis  a  través  de  la  Sección  Femenina.  Un  sujeto
colonizado.” Arenal 19:1 (2012): 143–59.
Bengochea Tirado,  Enrique. Políticas  imperiales  y género.  La Sección Femenina en la  Provincia de
Sahara (1961–1975). PhD diss., Universitat de València. Valencia, 2016.
Bonneuil, Christophe. “Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and
Postcolonial Africa.” Osiris 15 (2000): 258–81.
25
Campos, Alicia and Violeta Trasosmontes. “Recursos naturales y segunda ocupación colonial del Sáhara
español, 1959–1975.” Cahiers de l’EMAM 24–25 (2015): 107–29.
Caratini, Sophie. “A Propos du Mariage ‘Arabe.’ Discours Endogame et Pratiques Exogames: l’exemple
des Rgaybat du nord-ouest saharien.” L’Homme 29:110 (1989): 30–49.
Caratini, Sophie. “Du modèle aux pratiques: Ambivalence de la filiation et de l’alliance chez les Rgaybat
de l’ouest-saharien.” L’Homme 35:133 (1995): 33–50.
Caratini, Sophie. “La Prison Du Temps. Les mutations sociales à l’œuvre dans les camps de réfugiés
sahraouis. Première partie: la voie de la révolution.” Afrique Contemporaine 221:1 (2007): 153–72.
Caratini, Sophie. Les Rgaybat (1610–1931). Paris: Harmatan, 1989.
Correale,  Francesco.  “Islàm,  costruzioni  istituzionali  e ‘democrazia.’ Le origini  storiche del  Marocco
post-coloniale.” Meridione. Sud e Nord del Mondo 4:1 (2006): 166–202.
Correale,  Francesco.  “La  narración  de  la  historia  en  situación  de  crisis.  Reivindicaciones  y
contradicciones en la construcción memorial saharaui.” Les Cahiers d’EMAM 24–25 (2015): 151–
68.
Correale,  Francesco.  “La  ‘última  guerra  colonial’ de  España  y  la  literatura  militar  entre  memoria  y
conocimiento.”  In  7º  Congresso  Ibérico  de  Estudos  Africanos.  50  anos  das  independências
africanas:  desafios  para  a  modernidade.  Actas [Em linha],  Lisboa:  CEA,  2010,  online:  http:
//hdl.handle.net/10071/2326.
Correale,  Francesco.  “Le  Sahara  espagnol:  histoire  et  mémoire  du  rapport  colonial.  Un  essai
d’interprétation.” In  La question du pouvoir en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, edited by Sophie
Caratini, vol. 1: 103–52. Paris: Harmattan, 2009. 
Correale,  Francesco,  and  Alberto  López  Bargados.  “Rashōmon  au  Sahara  Occidental:  Perspectives,
Contradictions et Défis dans l’interprétation du Conflit  de 1956–1958.” In  Culture et Politique
dans l’Ouest Saharien. Arts,  Activisme et Etat dans un Espace de Conflits,  edited by Sébastien
Boulay and Francisco Freire, 211–41. Igé: L’Etrave, 2017.
26
Cueto,  Adolfo.  “Portugal  y  su  imperio  frente  a  la  descolonización,  1945–1962.”  Espacio,  Tiempo  y
Forma 5:23 (2011): 161–200.
Dalmases, Pablo-Ignacio. El Sahara Occidental en la bibliografía española y el discurso colonial.  PhD
diss. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Barcelona, 2013.
Darwin, John. “What Was the Late Colonial State?” Itinerario 23:3–4 (1999): 73–82.
Diego Aguirre, José Ramón. Guerra en el Sáhara. Madrid: Istmo, 1991.
Diego Aguirre, José Ramón.  La última guerra colonial de España. Ifni-Sáhara (1957–1958). Málaga:
Algazara, 2008.
Juliano, Dolores. La causa saharaui y las mujeres. “Siempre hemos sido muy libres.” Barcelona: Icaria,
1998.
Fernández-Aceytuno,  Mariano.  Ifni  y  Sáhara,  una  encrucijada  en  la  historia  de  España.  Dueñas:
Simancas editores, 2001.
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena. “‘Ideal’ Refugee Women and Gender Equality Mainstreaming in the Sahrawi
Refugee Camps: ‘Good Practice’ for Whom?” Refugee Survey Quarterly 29:2 (2010): 64–84.
Fink, Liz. “Institutional Terra Non Firma: Representative Democracy and the Chieftaincy in French West
Africa.” In France’s Modernising Mission: Citizenship, Welfare and the Ends of Empire, ed. by Ed
Naylor, 31–58. Palgrave: London, 2018.
García, Alejandro. Historias del Sahara: lo mejor y lo peor de los mundos. Madrid: La Catarata, 2001.
Geschiere,  Peter.  “Chiefs and Colonial  Rule  in Cameroon: Inventing Chieftaincy,  French and British
Style.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 63:2 (1993): 151–75.
Gimeno Martín, Juan Carlos. “Ambivalencia y orden colonial español en el Sahara Occidental: (1969–
1973).” Revista Andaluza de Antropología 5 (2013): 151–77.
Gozálvez  Pérez,  Vicente.  “Descolonización  y  migraciones  desde  el  África  Española.  1956–1975.”
Investigaciones Geográficas 12 (1994): 45–84.
Hodges, Tony. Western Sahara. The Roots of a Desert War. Westport, Conn: L. Hill, 1986.
27
Isidoros, Konstantina. “The Silencing of Unifying Tribes: The Colonial Construction of Tribe and Its
‘Extraordinary  Leap’ to  Nascent  Nation-State  Formation  in  Western  Sahara.”  Journal  of  the
Anthropological Society 7:2 (2015): 168–90.
Jerónimo, Miguel Bandeira. “Repressive Developmentalism: Idioms, Repertoires, and Trajectories in Late
Colonialism.”  The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire, ed. by Martin Thomas and Andrew
Thompson.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,
https://doi.org/  10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198713197.013.40  . 
Lewis, Joanna. Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya 1925–52. London: James Currey, 2000.
Loomba, Ania. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London: Routledge, 1998.
López Bargados, Alberto. Arenas coloniales. Los Awlad Dalim ante la colonización franco española del
Sahara. Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2003.
López Bargados, Alberto. “El Sahara ante su espejo: poéticas del punto muerto.” Les Cahiers d’EMAM
24–25 (2015): 133–50.
Louit,  Michel  Ivan.  Ecouvillon? Discrète opération de maintien de l’ordre franco-espagnole.  Sahara
Occidental 1957–1958. Paris: Marsouins et Méharistes, 2009.
MacMaster, Neil. Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the “Emancipation” of Muslim Women, 1954–
62. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.
Marín Ferrer, Emilio. Atlas ilustrado. Ifni, Sáhara, Guinea. Ultimas colonias. Madrid: Susaeta Ediciones,
2014.
Martin-Márquez, Susan. Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008.
Morillas, Javier. Sahara Occidental, desarrollo y subdesarrollo. Madrid: El Dorado, 1988.
Robinson,  Ronald.  “Non-European  Foundations  of  European  Imperialism.  Sketch  for  a  Theory  of
Collaboration.” In  Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe,
117–42. London: Longman, 1972.
28
Robles Picón, Juan Ignacio, et al. “La poesía saharaui en el nacimiento de la conciencia nacional.” Les
Cahiers d’EMAM 24–25 (2015): 55–76.
Rodríguez Esteban, José, and Diego Barrado Timón. “Los procesos de urbanización en el Sahara español
(1884–1975): un componente esencial del proyecto colonial.” Les Cahiers d’EMAM 24–25 (2015):
85–103.
Rodríguez Jiménez, José Luis.  Agonía, traición, huida: El final del Sahara español. Barcelona: Crítica,
2015.
San Martin, Pablo. Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010.
Segato, Rita Laura. “Género y colonialidad: en busca de claves de lectura y de un vocabulario estratégico
descolonial.” In Feminismos y poscolonialidad: descolonizando el feminismo desde y en America
Latina, ed. by Bidaseca, Karina, 17–47. Buenos Aires: Godot, 2011.
Stucki, Andreas. “¿Españolizar desde la raíz? La formación de una élite femenina de cooperación en el
‘pequeño imperio español,’ c. 1960–1975.” Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 17: 4 (2016): 343–
60.
Tejero Molina, Juan. El Sahara Español de la “A” a la “Z.” 2 vols. Madrid: Torres de Papel, 2013–2014.
Torres García, Ana.  La Guerra de las Arenas. Conflicto entre Marruecos y Argelia durante la Guerra
Fría (1963). Barcelona: Editorial Bellaterra, 2012.
Vidal Guardiola, Lorenzo.  Ifni, 1957–1958: la prensa y la guerra que nunca existió . Madrid: Almena,
2006.
Walter, Dierk. Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of Force. London: Hurst, 2017.
Zade, Mohammed. Résistance et Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947–1956). De l’action politique à la
lutte armée, rupture ou continuité? Rabat: Haut-Commissariat aux Anciens Résistants et Anciens
Membres de l’Armée de Libération, Editions Kawtar, 2006.
Zunes,  Stephen,  and  Jacob  Mundy.  Western  Sahara:  War,  Nationalism,  and  Conflict  Irresolution.
Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2014.
* * Enrique Bengochea Tirado is a postdoctoral fellow at the CRIA in the New University of Lisbon and is 
interested in gender, colonial policies, and imperialism in Spanish history. More specifically, his work examines the 
role of Sección Femenina in the Spanish colonisation of Western Sahara. Francesco Correale has a PhD in history from 
the Aix-Marseille University, Aix-en-Provence (France), and works at the National Centre for Scientific Research 
(CNRS) of France as an Ingénieur de recherche en analyse des sources for the laboratory CITERES; he is also a 
member of the research group Estudios Poscoloniales: Sáhara Occidental at the Autonomous University of Madrid. He 
is co-responsible, with A. López Bargados of the University of Barcelona, for the project Rashōmon in the Atlantic 
Sahara: Memories and Places in the ‘Ifni-Sahara War’ (1956–1958), funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation of 
Düsseldorf, and is PI of the project “Coloniality, Confinement and Order: Colonial and Postcolonial Forms of 
Internment in and Around the Mediterranean,” funded by MSH Val de Loire of Tours.
1  As reported by Tony Cruz Tizón, a journalist from the Sahara provincial weekly newspaper. See his “Encuesta
pública.”
2  According to Dalmases, El Sahara Occidental, 487–8. However, the origin of this saying is a topic of some 
debate. Fernández-Aceytuno, Ifni y Sáhara, 627, attributes the saying to General Díaz de Villegas y Bustamante, 
inspired by Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco and Francisco Franco in 1955. However, Diego Aguirre, La última guerra 
colonial, 83–4, attributes it directly to Carrero Blanco, in a document dated 27 March 1957.
3  See Martin-Márquez, Disorientations.
4  Correale, “La ‘última guerra colonial.’”
5  For more on this topic, see Al Fāsi, Livre rouge.
6  Cueto, “Portugal y su imperio,” 161–200.
7  Campos and Trasosmontes, “Recursos naturales,” 107–29; Darwin, “What Was the Late Colonial State?” 73–
82.
8  Lewis, Empire State-Building and MacMaster, Burning the Veil.
9  Traditionally, the title of sheikh signified a prestigious position obtained by individuals in accordance to their 
age, wisdom, or legacy within a family unit.
10  This use of traditional authorities was widespread at this time among most of the remaining colonial states—or
their descendants—as a counterpoint to ideas of popular sovereignty, which the Francoist dictatorship could not 
tolerate. See Fink, “Institutional Terra Non Firma” or Geschiere, “Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon.”
11  See for a theoretical framework on the overlaps of repression and development in the Portuguese case 
Jerónimo, “Repressive Developmentalism” and Bonneuil, “Development as Experiment.”
12  Correale, “La ‘última guerra colonial.’”
13  Balandier, “The Colonial Situation,” 34–61.
14  For an overview, see Walter, Colonial Violence.
15  See Zade, Résistance. 
16  For more details see: Diego Aguirre, La última guerra colonial, 57–126.
17  Marín Ferrer, Atlas ilustrado.
18  For more details on these events, see Correale and López Bargados,  “Rashōmon au Sahara occidental,” 211–
41; Louit, Ecouvillon?, 99–104.
19  During a trip to southern Morocco, Ahmed Balafredj, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, declared to the press that the Army of Liberation was formed by rebellious and subversive groups that 
remained uncontrolled and difficult to neutralise. See Hodges, Western Sahara, 104.
20  See Torres García, La Guerra de las Arenas.
21  See Correale, “Islàm,” 166–202. In 1965, a state of exception was declared and parliament was suspended, 
while in 1971 and 1972, two attempted military coup d’états occurred. 
22  When the Resolution 2229 (XXI) on the Sahara was voted on in December 1966, inviting Madrid to organise a
referendum with the support of the UN, only Spain, together with Portugal, voted against the resolution. Later, in 1967 
and 1968, Resolutions 2354 (XXII) y 2428 (XXIII) were voted on, with identical content to the resolution of 1966, but 
with a positive vote from Spain.
23  The issue of irregular troops at the borders has not been researched in depth until now (see Fernandez-
Aceytuno, Ifni y Sáhara, 624–7). Nonetheless, the actions of these troops are confirmed by the documentation found in 
the AGA and in the diplomatic correspondence from the French embassies and consulates in Morocco and Mauritania, 
preserved at the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes. Further information also in the documents of the 
General Government of Algeria, preserved at the Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer of Aix-en-Provence and in the 
documentation on the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf.
24  It is interesting to note how everything was carefully monetised, establishing a standardised price for the death
of an individual by bombing at 12,500 pesetas, according to the undated document AGA “Indemnizaciones por 
muerte,” 15(28), S 2270, exp. 2. Based on a letter from the General Secretary of the Province, AGA, letter of 11 
September 1958, S 2196, exp. 4, we also know the value of livestock: a camel was worth 3,000 pesetas, a goat 300 
pesetas, and a donkey 1,000 pesetas.
25  For more information, see Correale, “Le Sahara espagnol,” 133–6.
26  Ibid., 133–39.
27  As an official leafletput it in 1966, “In order to put an end to this state of affairs [nomadic way of life], a 
policy of settling nomads in urban centres was initiated.”(Instituto de Estudios Africanos (CSIC), Sahara, Provincia 
española, 23)
28  Morillas, Sahara Occidental, 214, 225.
29  García, Historias del Sahara, 88.
30  National Paradores are a network of high-class public hotels. Their origins date back to the 1920s, although 
many more were opened later on, especially during the 1960s. 
31  Gozálvez Pérez, “Descolonización,” 48.
32  Organisation established by the Franco dictatorship with the aim of increasing construction of houses. This 
occurred in the 1950s, in an attempt to address the population crises some cities were experiencing.
33  Houses designed especially for the Sahrawi population in 1971 were meant to group families together, leaving 
a central space to use for any small livestock they may have had. See Rodríguez Esteban and Barrado Timón, “Los 
procesos de urbanización.”
34  As per the table elaborated by Barona, Los hijos de la nube, 105, hospitals and outpatient clinics are 
mentioned, as well as centres at military posts.
35  Barona, Los hijos de la nube, 85.
36  See Bengochea Tirado, “Políticas imperiales y género.” 
37  Sección Femenina emerged as a women’s organisation of the fascist political party Falange Española. After 
the Francoist victory of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), this institution was put in charge of all Spanish women in 
the one-party system.
38  For more details concerning the economic policy in the Spanish Sahara, see Morillas, Sahara Occidental. 
39  Stucki, “¿Españolizar desde la raíz?” 343–60. 
40  RAH, “Informe resumen de la labor realizada por la Sección Femenina del Movimiento y Proyecto de su 
actuación futura en la provincia de Sahara,” Madrid, 11 October 1975, NA, Serie Azul, 166.
41  Barona, Los hijos de la nube, 191.
42  See “Administración local y provincial,” in Tejero Molina, El Sahara Español, vol. 1: 158–61. In fact, 37 
representatives were elected by direct vote and 46 chosen from amongst tribal leaders. Despite being somewhat limited 
to local and family issues, the institution did have some political clout, serving as an advisory body for the central 
government. In 1973, in a desperate attempt to expand its political and social base, the Yemáa increased from 82 to 102 
members.
43  San Martin, Western Sahara, 54.
44  Caratini, “Du modèle aux pratiques,” 43 onwards.
45  López Bargados, Arenas coloniales, 472.
46  Segato, “Género y colonialidad,” 17–47.
47  AGMAV, “Dotes matrimoniales,” 12 October 1971, caja 30286, carp 3.
48  These changes had an effect on marriage strategies, as colonial interference tended to consolidate the internal 
cohesion of the qabila (tribe), leading marriages towards the sheikh who was best at negotiating. On the other hand, 
those descendants who found themselves in a more favourable situation preferred to marry within the limits of their 
marriage areas, creating a national network with new elements that were closely related to economic and political 
power. See Caratini, “Du modèle aux pratiques,” 45.
49  Caratini, “A Propos du mariage,” 30–49.
50   It is worth noting the existence of a divorce procedure that adapted the Islamic concept of divorce. According 
to this principle, a woman could ask her husband for a divorce, and he would be socially obliged to accept. The fact that
the majority of marriages were endogamous results in mediation of both the husband’s family as well as the wife’s, the 
two of which tended to be related. This mediation sometimes slowed divorce proceedings; in other cases, it could 
provide women with the possibility of negotiating their situation. Sophie Caratini, in a study on Mauritanian Reguibats, 
highlights that close families tended to seek mediation in order to avoid divorce. However, this turned out to be more 
difficult in endogamous marriages. Nonetheless, Juliano, in a study carried out in the Tindouf refugee camps, argues 
that these endogamous marriages protected women, thanks to mediation from family members. It is possible that these 
differing opinions are due to the study of different qabilas, as French anthropology has studied southern tribes, while 
Spanish studies have focused on other, more northern ones. It could also simply be a tool that may or may not be 
activated, depending on the different cases or contexts. See Caratini, Les Rgaybat and Juliano, La causa saharaui.
51  AGA, “Informe sobre la actitud política de la mujer saharaui,” Laayoune, October 1974, 3(51.19), caja 236.
52  For more details, see Bengochea Tirado, Entrega, hogar e imperio, 168; and Allan, Silenced Resistance, 36–
44.
53  Bengochea Tirado, “Las mujeres saharauis,” 143–59.
54  Despite it being true that the Falangist organisation acted in favour of some Sahrawi close to the SF, and its 
continued opposition to early marriage, these claims were always dealt with in an informal manner. 
55  Morillas, Sahara Occidental, 231.
56  Data which should be treated with caution; in San Martin, Western Sahara, 63.
57  Morillas, Sahara Occidental, 237.
58  Gobierno General del Sahara, Censo, 5.
59  The census included 3,018 “adoptees and poor relatives,” the majority of whom were essentially slaves. This 
group made up approximately 4 percent of the census population. Slavery can be traced back to the sheikhs, who had 
sufficient economic resources to possess and keep slaves. As the Tomás Bárbulo notes, several sources confirm the 
complicity of the Spanish authorities in the continuance of this practice; in some cases, military groups even aided in 
the pursuit of escaped slaves. See Bárbulo, Historia prohibida, 48.
60  Gobierno General del Sahara, Censo, 19.
61  García, Historias del Sahara, 39.
62  Morillas, Sahara Occidental, 184.
63  Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos.
64  In the 1974 census, only 17 percent of the inhabitants in the Sahara were considered to be nomads. 
Approximately 57 percent of the population lived within one of the main urban centres (Laayoune, Villa Cisneros, 
Smara, and La Güera), and the rest resided in small settlements. See Gobierno General del Sahara, Censo.
65  Rodríguez Esteban and Barrado Timón, “Los procesos de urbanización,” 86.
66  Robles Picón et al., “La poesía saharaui,” 55–76.
67  Awad, “Generaciones literarias,” 29–54.
68  Gimeno Martín, “Ambivalencia y orden colonial,” 151–77.
69
70  San Martin, Western Sahara, 47.
71  Alonso del Barrio, Las Tribus del Sahara.
72  Morillas, Sahara Occidental, 238; San Martin, Western Sahara, 54.
73  See Bárbulo, Historia prohibida, 66–95.
74  Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 91–139. 
75  The historian José Luis Rodríguez points to the importance of ideas of some sectors of the colonial 
government to prepare independence through a phase of Sahrawi self-government. This was meant to be led by the 
sheikhs with the support of some young and literate Sahrawis. See Rodríguez, Agonía, traición, huida, part 2.
76  Diego Aguirre, Guerra en el Sáhara, 64–96.
77  Caratini, “La Prison du Temps,” 153–72.
78  Isidoros, “The Silencing of Unifying Tribes,” 185.
79  Allan, “Imagining Saharawi Women,” 189–202.
80  Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, “‘Ideal’ Refugee Women,” 64–84.
81  Caratini, “La Prison du Temps,” 163. 
82  Balandier, “The Colonial Situation.”
83  Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 39.
84  Robinson, “Non-European Foundations,” 117–42.
85  See Vidal Guardiola, Ifni.
86  Correale, “La narración de la historia,” 151–68.
87  López Bargados, “El Sahara ante su espejo,” 133–50.
